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COMMENT/ Exclusivity of Prisons Industries Fund:
An Epilogue to United States v. Muniz
ON SEPTEMBER 21, 1965, Judge Freeman, writing for a unanimous Third
Circuit, held' that the Federal Statute dealing with the Prison Industries
Fund2 was not the exclusive remedy for inmates injured in federal peniten-
tiaries. When the inmate could show negligence on the part of prison au-
thorities, he was entitled to sue the government in tort under the Federal
Tort Claims Act.'s Thus, Demko who was injured while performing mainte-
nance work at Lewisburg Penitentiary, was not barred from recovery even
though he was entitled to compensation.
Five months later, the Second Circuit was faced with the same question.
The court affirmed a summary judgment for the defendant government. 4
Through Judge Waterman, the court held that the Prison Industries Fund
was a comprehensive compensation scheme and by its nature exclusive.
The stage for this conflict between the circuits was set by the decision of
the Supreme Court in Muniz v. United States.5 Prior to Muniz, the existence
of compensation was extraneous as the question before the courts was wheth-
er a prisoner had any cause of action for negligence under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. Until Muniz allowed such suits, the question of the exclusivity
between tort and compensation recoveries was, for all practical purposes,
moot. Since Muniz represents the culmination of an evolution of recovery
that began with civil death6 and is presently at a stage that admits the pos-
sibilities of dual recovery for prisoners, the decision must be viewed in per-
spective.
Prior to Muniz, the weight of authority supported the government's con-
tention that a prisoner injured through the negligence of his jailer had no
cause of action against the United States.7 In the absence of any federal stat-
1Demko v. United States, 350 F.2d 698 (3d Cir. 1965).
218 U.S.C. § 4126 (.1964).
Federal Tort Claims Act, Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.).
' Grande v. United States, 356 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1956).
5374 U.S. 150 (19613).
" Civil death is imposed only by statute. There is no such federal statute. See Cohen v.
United States, 252 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ga. 1966); Winston v. United States, 305 F.2d 253 (2d
Cir. 1962); Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944); 63 YALE L. J. 418 (1954).
Berman v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 107 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
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ute imposing civil death upon prison inmates, the government relied upon
the provisions of the Tort Claims Act itself. The Act provided a remedy
against the United States when the claim arose:
under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred. 8
The case of Berman v. United States9 is typical of the almost universal ac-
ceptance of this proposition by the courts. In Berman, the plaintiff sued for
personal injuries caused by the negligence of government employees at the
United States Public Health Hospital at Lexington, Kentucky. The plain-
tiff was a prisoner confined to the hospital for treatment as a narcotics ad-
dict. The court, in interpreting the Prison Industries Fund relied heavily on
Feres v. United States'o and held that the relationship between the govern-
ment and the plaintiff was "distinctly Federal in character," that private
citizens did not run prisons, and therefore the government could not be held
liable as if it were a private person and subject to the local tort law as ap-
plied through the Federal Tort Claims Act.
A well-reasoned minority response to this status argument was given two
years later by the Northern District of Alabama. In Lawrence v. United
States" the plaintiff was a federal prisoner seeking recovery for injuries sus-
tained while riding in a truck driven by a civilian employee of the Air
Force.' 2 In rejecting the proposition that there was anything in the federal
government-prisoner status which precludes recovery, the court held:
While it is rational to conclude that in the sphere of private individuals there
is no equivalent of the jailer-prisoner relationship, it is running a good principle
into the ground to declare in terms of categorical imperative that a federal pris-
oner, by virtue of his status alone, may not sue the United States under the pro-
visions of the Federal Tort Claims Act where his claim is based upon the alleged
negligence of a federal employee completely disassociated from his status.' s
It is ironic that this status argument, which so long delayed a final deter-
mination of the amount of recovery allowable to an injured prisoner, did not
begin with a prisoner at all, but rather, is traceable to an action instituted by
OFederal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
'Supra note 7.
1o340 U.S. 135 (1950).
u 193 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Ala. 1961).
U There was no dispute concerning the government's negligence in Lawrence. There were
two government vehicles in the accident, both driven by government employees, and there
was no doubt that one of them had been negligent.
13 Lawrence v. United States, supra note 11, at 245.
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the executrix of a serviceman killed in a barracks fire. In Feres v. United
States,14 Mr. Justice Jackson writing for a unanimous court 5 held that the
Federal Tort Claims Act did not extend its remedy to members of the armed
forces who sustain, incident to their service, what would otherwise be ac-
tionable wrong. In the course of his opinion, Mr. Justice Jackson stated:
The relationship between the government and members of its armed forces is
"distinctively federal in character" as this court recognized in United States v.
Standard Oil, 332 U.S. 30.18
Because of the "distinctively federal" relationship, the court doubted that
Congress could have intended that servicemen have a remedy dependent
upon local law.17 The denial of recovery to members of the armed forces be-
cause of the federal character of their employment was easily analogous to
the prison situation, and was subsequently imported into the latter area.' 8
Until 1963, the denial of recovery, as represented by Berman,19 was clearly
the rule20 with Lawrence2' producing a unique exception.
Though the Feres decision (though modified) is still good law in the vet-
erans' situation, in United States v. Muniz2 2 the Supreme Court finally con-
sidered the specific case of a federal prisoner's recovery under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Carlos Muniz was a federal prisoner at Danbury, Connecti-
cut. He alleged that he was beaten by twelve fellow inmates as a result of the
negligence of prison guards. The District Court dismissed his complaint
under the tort claims act, but the Second Circuit reversed on the grounds
that an inmate could recover under the Act.23
In the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Warren, writing for a unanimous
Court24 held that while the government is not liable for the intentional torts
of its employees, or for the acts or omissions of its employees exercising due
care in the execution of a statute or regulation or in performing a discre-
tionary function, it is liable for the negligent acts of its employees which
cause personal injuries to federal prisoners.
1, Supra note 10.
15Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in the result, but not in the reasoning of the court.
16 Ferris v. United States, supra note 10, at 143.
1728 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964).
VanZuch v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Sigmonv v. United States.
110 F. Supp. 906 (D. Va. 1953); Shew v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 1 (D.N.C. 1953); Lock
v. United States, 262 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1958); Jones v. United States, 249 F.2d 864 (7th
Cir. 1957).
19 Berman v. United States, supra note 7.
See cases cited in note 18, supra.
SLawrence v. United States, supra note 11.
374 U.S. 150 (1963).
Muniz v. United States, 305 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1962).
u Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
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While Muniz swept away many of the traditional defenses interposed by
the government as nonconductors of liability in suits by federal prisoners
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, it left uncertain the effect of the avail-
ability of compensation under the Prison Industries Fund.25 While the Chief
Justice did say that "[T]he presence of a compensation system ... does not
necessarily preclude a suit for negligence," 26 he went on to point out that
Muniz was not covered by compensation. However, an indication of the
court's present attitude toward the Demko-Grande controversy may be as-
certained by the court's citing as authority for the proposition that a com-
pensation system does not necessarily preclude tort recovery, the case of
United States v. Brown.
27
In Brown, the plaintiff was a member of the Army Air Force who had in-
jured his knee on active duty. Seven years after his discharge, an operation
was negligently performed on his knee at a Veterans Administration Hos-
pital. The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's decision 28 for the
plaintiff. Even though the plaintiff had been compensated for the injury un-
der veteran's compensation, 29 the Court felt the Congress could have made
veteran's compensation exclusive as they had made federal employees' com-
pensation exclusive, but since Congress had not specifically done so, there
was no reason to deny recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act. More-
over, Muniz appears to affirm Winston v. United States3o where the Second
Circuit noted that in computing damages in any recovery under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, the trial judge should deduct the amount of any compensa-
tion paid. While the deduction of a compensation recovery from the tort
recovery is, in dollar amount, the equivalent of a single recovery, it still ad-
mits the availability of a tort action.
However, there is much contrary authority. In Nobles v. Federal Prison
Industries, Inc.,3 x the district court held that since the plaintiff was covered
by compensation:
It was extremely unlikely that Congress, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, in-
tended to impose any broad tort liability upon the part of the government to its
prisoners.82
"Prison Industries Fund, 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1964), provides compensation pursuant to
regulations promulgated by the Attorney General:
... to inmates or their dependents for injuries suffered in an industry or in any activity
in connection with the maintenance or operation of the institution where confined.
Muniz v. United States, supra note 22, at 160.
p348 U.S. 110 (1954).
Brown v. United States, 209 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1954).
Veteran's Compensation Act, 38 U.S.C. 501(a) (1964).
50 3 5 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1962).




Both the Demko and Grande decisions3 rely heavily upon Muniz. While
it appears doubtful that Muniz represents any authority as to the exclusive-
ness of the Prison Industries Fund, the following language from the Second
Circuit opinion indicates the conflict which has arisen from the lower court's
struggle to find an answer in Muniz.
We realize that our reading of Muniz is at variance with that of the third circuit
in Demko v. United States, 350 Fed. 2nd 698 (third circuit 1965), decided only
a few months ago. It is our conclusion that the third circuit in Demko has mis-
interpreted the decision of the court in Muniz, and we do not adopt that inter-
pretation.3 4
In the absence of any language controlling the question of exclusivity in
the Muniz decision, and the subsequent controversy over the interpretation
of that case, it might be more fruitful to focus attention upon the Court's
reference to its decision in Brown v. United States. Although Brown dealt
with veterans compensation, cursory observation reveals similarities between
the Veterans' Compensation Act 35 and the Prison Industries Fund36 so strong
that the significance of Brown need not be limited to a mere indication of
the future attitude of the Court on exclusivity. For all purposes relevant
here, the acts are identical, at least insofar as neither act contains a provision
for exclusiveness of recovery.3 7 However, the applicability of Brown to the
question of exclusivity in prison compensation goes beyond the similarity of
the statutes. For the issue of exclusivity in Brown was also precipitated by
the decision of the Supreme Court in Feres v. United States. The relevance
of this is evident when it is realized that every decision concerning the ex-
clusivity of prison compensation, arising after Feres, has considered it nec-
essary to discuss the authority of Feres.38 However, to appreciate the import
of Brown, an examination of the viability of Feres is necessary.
Before the appearance of Feres, the leading case concerned with the ex-
clusivity of the Veterans' Compensation Act, was Brooks v. United States.39
11 Demko v. United States, supra note 1 and Grande v. United States, supra note 4.
" Grande v. United States, supra note 4, at 842. As a matter of fact, Demko was decided
on September 21, 1965, after the decision of the district court in Grande had been filed, but
before the Second Circuit heard oral argument on appeal.
85Supra note 29.
'1Supra note 2.
1 Both the Federal Employee's Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 757(b) (1964), and the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964) are specifi-
cally exclusive.
Cole v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 7 (N.D. Ga. 1965); Lawrence v. United States, 193 F.
Supp. 243 (N.D. Ala. 1961); Gomez v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 145 (D. Colo. 1965); Demko
v. United States, 350 F.2d 698 (3d Cir. 1965); Grande v. United States, 356 F.2d 837 (2d Cir.
1966); Nobles v. United States, 213 F. Supp. 731 (N.D. Ga. 1963).
8 Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
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In Brooks, plaintiff sought to recover for the wrongful death of his intestate
which arose when a government-owned truck negligently collided with de-
cedent's car. The government moved to dismiss on the ground that the de-
cedent was a member of the armed forces. The fact that he had recovered
under the Veterans' Compensation Act was used to buttress this contention.
In allowing plaintiff to maintain his action, the court held:
Provisions in other statutes for disability payments to servicemen, and gratuity
payments to their survivors.., indicates no purpose to forbid tort actions under
the Tort Claims Act. Unlike the usual workmen's compensation statute, e.g., 33
U.S.C. § 905, there is nothing in the Tort Claims Act or the Veterans' Laws which
provide for exclusiveness of remedy.... We will not call either remedy in the
present case exclusive, nor pronounce a doctrine of election of remedies, when
Congress has not done so.4o
An awareness of the mechanics of the Court's opinion leads to a greater
appreciation of the significance of Feres. In Brooks, the issue of exclusivity
recognized the existence of a compensation system only subordinately. The
issue before the Court was whether plaintiff, a member of the armed forces,
could maintain a suit against the United States under the Tort Claims Act.
The issue was not whether the existence of a compensation system made re-
covery under it exclusive. Rather, the availability of compensation was em-
ployed as an indication of a legislative purpose to except servicemen from
recovery under the Tort Claims Act. The holding of the Court specifically
focused upon the wording of the Tort Claims Act-"we are not persuaded
that 'any claim' means 'any claim but that of servicemen.' "41 The progeny
of Brooks are unanimous in their focus upon the wording of the Tort Claims
Act for the answer to exclusivity, which the courts interpreted as containing
no implied exceptions. 42
Therefore, when the Feres decision was handed down, the law on service-
men's recovery had been determined by the absence of any specific exclu-
sion in the Tort Claims Act. Feres reversed this by holding that there could
be no recovery under the Tort Claims Act for the death of an army officer
caused by a fire in allegedly unsafe barracks where he was quartered while
on active duty. The Court said that "the only issue of law raised is whether
the Tort Claims Act extends its remedy to one sustaining 'incident to the
[armed] service' what under other circumstances would be an actionable
wrong."48 In holding that the plaintiff could not recover, the Court held that
'Old. at 53.
,aId. at 51.
"Bandy v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 360 (D. Nev. 1950); Santana v. United States, 175
F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1949).
, Feres v. United States, supra note 10, at 138.
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the Tort Claims Act prescribes the test of allowable claims in "the same man-
ner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circum-
stances ... "44 It was reasoned that since a private person does not run
armies:
Plaintiff can point to no liability of a private individual, even remotely analo-
gous to that which they are asserting against the United States.. . for no private
individual has power to constrict or mobilize a private army .... 45
However, the Court went beyond this determination of what was con-
ceded to be the only issue before it. In a seeming attempt to mitigate and
buttress its holding, the Court pointed to the existence of a compensation
system under which Feres might recover. The Court said:
This Court, in deciding claims for wrongs incident to service under the Tort
Claims Act, cannot escape attributing some bearing upon it to enactments of
Congress which provide systems of simple, certain, and uniform compensation
for injuries or death of those in armed services. We might say that the claimant
may (a) enjoy both types of recovery, or (b) elect which to pursue, thereby
waiving the other, or (c) pursue both, crediting the larger liability with the pro-
ceeds of the smaller, or (d) that the compensation remedy excludes the tort rem-
edy. There is as much statutory authority for one as for the other of these con-
clusions. If Congress had contemplated that this Tort Act would be held to ap-
ply in cases of this kind, it is difficult to see why it should have omitted any pro-
vision to adjust these two types of remedy to each other. The absence of any such
adjustment is persuasive that there was no awareness that the Act might be in-
terpreted to permit recovery for injury incident to military service. (Emphasis
added.)
46
Since it is the quoted language which has precipitated the present con-
troversy, it requires intense analysis. What was the Court holding? If we ac-
cept the Court's determination of the issue before it, Feres held that a serv-
iceman could not recover under the Tort Claims Act because of the Federal
character of his status. The existence of a compensation system is, first, dicta;
and secondly, used solely as a key in the determination of whether the Tort
Claims Act expressly or impliedly excluded servicemen's claims.
However, the interpretation of this dicta by subsequent decisions, has
been a process of gradual distortion. Thus, in 1952, an army nurse who had
suffered a service-connected injury, was limited to recovery under the Vet-
"28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964).
,sFeres v. United States, supra note 10, at 141.
SId. at 144.
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erans' Compensation Act.47 The distortion of Feres, where the existence of
compensation was used to read the Tort Claims Act, is evident from the lan-
guage of Judge Harris:
Thus, under the Supreme Court decision in Feres v. United States, plaintiff is
precluded from suing under the Tort Claims Act.... Since there exists a Veter-
ans' Compensation System which assures protection to plaintiff, at least as broad
in scope as the Tort Claims Act, she is limited to her recovery under the Veter-
ans' Compensation System which affords the exclusive remedy.
48
Thus, for the court in Pettis, the existence of a compensation system was
no longer a key to the intent of Congress in the Tort Claims Act, but rather
the intent of Congress in the passage of the Compensation Act. It was no
longer necessary for the courts to look at the Tort Claims Act-preclusion
from recovery was to be found in the compensation system. This is the argu-
ment of Grande. Relying on the rationale of these post-Feres cases, 49 the
court concluded that "when Congress provides a system of simple, certain,
and uniform benefits, it intends this system to be the exclusive means of re-
dress for all those within its scope." 50
It is at this point that the decision of Brown becomes of major signifi-
cance. For, in the very area in which the Feres decision operated-Veterans'
Compensation-the Supreme Court ended the possibility of preclusion from
Tort Claims Act coverage because of the existence of compensation. In hold-
ing that the plaintiff's ability to recover compensation did not preclude a
tort action, the Court, after distinguishing Johansen v. United States,5' be-
cause of the specific exclusion in the Federal Employees Compensation Act,
held in Brown that:
Congress [has] given no indication that it made the right to compensation the
Veteran's exclusive remedy .... the receipt of disability payments under the Vet-
erans' Act [is] not an election of remedies and [does] not preclude recovery un-
der the Tort Claims Act .... 52
Thus, the argument and authority relied upon in those decisions holding
the Prison Compensation Act to be exclusive, is no longer the law in its own
area. Feres is presently authority only for the proposition that a serviceman
injured while performing a function incident to his service, cannot recover
'7 Pettis v. United States, 108 F. Supp 500 (N.D. Cal. 1952); O'Neil v. United States,-202
F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
0 Pettis v. United States, supra note 47, at 501-02.
4 Supra note 38.
0 Grande v. United States, supra note 4, at 841.
a' Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427 (1952).
"Brown v. United States, supra note 27, at 113.
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under the Tort Claims Act. This decision operates irrespective of the exist-
ence of a Compensation System. The result is that a court can rely on Feres
for either its holding or its dicta. However, its holding is inapplicable to
prison compensation because the Court in Muniz rejected the contention
that the "distinctively federal character" of maintaining penal institutions
precludes recovery by an inmate. Therefore, what the courts are holding
out as Supreme Court authority is, in reality, nothing but dicta, and more
importantly, dicta which has been decisively rejected by Brown.
It is at this point that the inevitability of controversy can be appreciated.
The court in Demko admitted that it was second-guessing its authority. The
court in Grande was relying upon rejected dicta. However, to dismiss the
Grande decision as patent misreading of authority, would smack of injus-
tice, for perhaps the Court in Feres inadvertently articulated a proposition
which would find sympathy in later decisions. For there is some appeal to
the notion that Congress could not have intended dual recovery in tort ac-
tions where the victim is also covered by compensation. This argument was
obliquely accepted by the Supreme Court in Johansen where it was said that
"there is no reason to have two systems of redress."
5
The fact that the Federal Employees Compensation Act contains a pro-
vision for exclusivity acts as a catalyst to the cogency of this argument. It
must be presumed that Congress acts with a certain amount of fairness and
consistency. Proceeding from this assumption, it seems to make no sense that
Congress would hold its federal employees to single recovery while allowing
dual recovery for prisoners. However, the fatal flaw in the argument is that
it must proceed from a subjective conception of what Congress intended.
Because of the absence of any controlling language, the decisions of those
courts finding exclusivity of remedy under prison compensation, are, of ne-
cessity, bottomed upon the assumption that Congress could not have in-
tended dual recovery.
54
Johansen v. United States, supra note 51.
The pressing question is, of course, why not. Is it any less valid to read the absence of
any exclusivity provision in Prison Compensation as indicative of a Congressional purpose
to allow dual recovery as it was in Veterans' Compensation? For example, it is so evident a
fact that it can meet the requirements of judicial notice that Congress is a popularly elected
body. Let us conjure in our mind's eye the picture of a legislator, representing the collec-
tiv-e attitude of Congress, who appreciates that another election will soon be upon him.
Now, he looks at the condition of the federal prisons and is disturbed. He sees problems of
overcrowding, understafling, and antiquated facilities. He recognizes these problems as dan-
gerous and appreciates the direct proportion between injuries and unsafe conditions. How-
ever, he also realizes that monetary allocations to prisons are not too popular, especially
when they are made at the expense of new schools, roads, and hospitals in his constituency.
Therefore, he conceives of a way to improve prison conditions without angering his electors.
He votes for a non-exclusive Compensation Act. He realizes that dual recovery may be ex-
pensive, but he is taking a long-range view. He realizes that as the dollar output by the
United States under both systems of recovery increases, the more attractive and fiscally re-
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The argument that since Congress usually makes compensation systems
exclusive, 55 it must have intended (although it did not say so) prison com-
pensation to be exclusive, must be questioned. There is a fallacious logic in
the argument which has resulted from courts having assumed their major
premise, i.e., that compensation systems are inherently presumed exclusive.
This assumption was clearly rejected in Brown, and was not made by the
Supreme Court in Feres. However, this is not to say that it is totally with-
out merit. If recovery under both tort claims and prison compensation is not
prohibited, a good argument 56 can be made that it should be. But there is
a vast difference between making the argument and holding that the two
acts are exclusive, buttressing this conclusion upon what is claimed to be
Supreme Court authority.
Moreover, not only is analogy to the Federal Employees Compensation
Act an unwarranted assumption, but an examination of the two acts reveals
differences which preclude the validity of comparison. The Federal Em-
ployees Compensation Act provides a system of compensation so complete
that it can be recognized as the quid pro quo of a waiver of tort liability.
However, the differences between this act and the Prison Industries Fund
are so great that they militate against a presumption that Congress ever in-
tended the latter act to be a comprehensive substitute for tort liability.
The first difference between the two acts is, of course, obvious-while the
prison act 57 has no provision for exclusiveness, the Federal Employees Com-
pensation Act 58 provides that it will be an exclusive remedy. However, there
are other less obvious provisions of the Prison Industries' Fund, which leave
the act far short of a fair substitute for tort liability. Another example is the
fact that the United States Code imposes a duty on the Bureau of Prisons to
care for the safety of prisoners. The applicable provision reads:
sponsible will be a measure to improve unsafe conditions thereby reducing accidents with
their attendant claims. It is conceivable that if the dollar amount of recovery under Tort
Claims and Prison Compensation soar, our Congressman may someday be able to allocate
directly funds necessary to improve prison conditions. Should this result in a decrease in the
prison accident rate, he may then be in a position to take the money saved by the reduction
of claims and earmark it for new federal grants-in-aid to his constituency. Our Congressman
has his cake, and has eaten it too.
The authors appreciate that this explanation of the intent of Congress in not putting an
exclusivity provision in Prison Compensation may appear far-fetched. However, is it any
less valid an hypothesis than one which assumes legislative inadvertence? The argument of
Grande is that Congress usually makes compensation an exclusive recovery but apparently
neglected to do so in prison compensation.
Federal Employee's Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 757(b) (1964); Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Act, 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964).
m Grande v. United States, supra note 4, is typical of the court's frequent agreement with
this argument.
7 Prison Industries Fund, 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1964).
5 U.S.C. § 757(b) (1964).
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Duties of the Bureau of Prisons ...
(2) Provide suitable quarters and provide for the safe-keeping, care, and sub-
sistence of all. .. [prisoners]....
(3) Provide for protection, instruction, and discipline of all... [prisons].59
Under the Prison Industries Fund even when recovery is allowed, there
are many restrictions not found in the Federal Employees Compensation
Act. Thus, under the prior act, an inmate receives compensation not at the
time of the injury, but only upon his release. 60 A former inmate receives no
compensation unless he is still disabled at the time of his release. 61 Contribu-
tory negligence on the part of the inmate would appear to preclude recov-
ery.62 While the foregoing restrictions may be justified in the prison situa-
tion since the prisoner is paid while he is disabled and receives free room,
board and medical treatment, several other restrictions indicate that the
prison compensation scheme is not intended as a comprehensive substitute
for the right63 to recover under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Under the Prison Act, the amount of an award rests entirely within the
discretion of the Attorney General. 64 Moreover, payments are discontinued
if the former inmate commits a crime, although the payments may be con-
tinued to dependents. 65 Normally, claims must be submitted through the
person in charge of the claimant at the time of the injury66 in spite of the
fact that this is probably the very person whose negligence has caused the
injury. Medical attention subsequent to discharge may be obtained only if
the Commissioner of Prison Industries approves. 67
Despite the fact that the prisoner can receive no compensation until after
his release, the prison industry corporation has the right to pay his depend-
ents in lieu of the former inmate. 68 Finally, the retention of an attorney is
clearly discouraged. The regulations state that all just claims will be paid
and no attorney is necessary. If one is retained, the inmate may not assign
more than $25 to pay for these services.6 9 Unlike the Federal Employees Coin-
18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1964).
"28 C.F.R. § 801.1 (1966).
6128 C.F.R. § 301.2 (1966).
"28 C.F.R. § 301.4 (1966).
"Whether a federal prisoner had a right to recover for the negligence of his jailer was
disputed at common law. Compare Tyler v. Gobin, 94 Fed. 48 (1899) (recovery allowed),
with Golub v. Krinsky, 185 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (recovery denied). These early cases
involved suits against the jailer, not against the government which was protected by sover-
eign immunity. There can be no doubt that the federal prisoner now has the right to main-
tain an action against the government as a result of the decision in Muniz.
,63 YALE L.J. 418, 419 (1954).
"28 C.F.R. § 301.5 (1966).
28 C.F.R. § 301.7 ('1966).
28 C.F.R. § 301.8 (1966).
"28 C.F.R. § 301.9 (1966).
-28 C.F.R. § 301.10 (1966).
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pensation Act 70 the Prison Act makes no provision for a physical by a private
physician or an opportunity for an administrative review.
An examination of the foregoing provisions makes it quite apparent that
the government does not regard a prisoner's recovery under the Compensa-
tion Act as a matter of right. Since Muniz makes it clear that the prisoner
has a right to recover for negligence, it is difficult to fathom the contention
that a discretionary Prison Industries Fund can be substituted for this right.
Finally, the Prison Industries Fund allows:
Compensation to inmates or their dependents for injuries suffered in any indus-
try. In no event shall the compensation be paid in a greater amount than that
provided in the Federal Employees Compensation Act.
7 1
The argument can be made72 that while compensation based on the income
of the average federal employee is adequate, this standard is vitiated as a
meaningful criterion in the prison situation which is notorious for its low
wages.
In addition to differences between statutory provisions and dollar amount
of recovery, there is another consideration which militates against the Prison
Industries Fund being regarded as an exclusive means of redress. The result
of a decision of exclusivity will arbitrarily create a class of individuals pre-
cluded from recovery under the Tort Claims Act. While Congress has seen
fit to except certain claims from a right of recovery under the Tort Claims
Act,78 it has not asked the courts to add to the list of exceptions. The Supreme
Court's initial reaction to the Act may have been one of strict construction
against the claimant,74 but later cases make it clear that this has been aban-
doned.
For example, in Indian Towing Company v. United States,75 the Court
rejected a government argument that the Tort Claims Act excluded liability
in the performance of activities which private persons do not perform, and
allowed the plaintiff to recover for damages caused by the negligence of the
Coast Guard in causing a lighthouse to fall into disrepair. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's majority opinion recognizes both the expansive scope of the Tort
Claims Act and the position occupied by the courts in its application. The
opinion reads:
See 5 U.S.C. § 757(b) (1964).
18 U.S.C. § 1426 (1964).
72 For this argument see 38 WASH. L. REv. 338 (1961). It should be noted that the author
was told by the Bureau of Prisons that the prison wage base for compensation is considered
to be the minimum wage of $1.25 per hour.
28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1964).
7, See, e.g., Dalhite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
7-350 U.S. 61 (1955).
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Of course, when dealing with a statute subjecting the government to liability for
potentially great sums of money, this court must not promote profligacy by care-
less construction. Neither should it as a self-constituted guardian of the Treas-
ury import immunity back into a statute designed to limit it.76
Two years later, the Court had an opportunity to reconsider its liberal ap-
plication of the act in Indian Towing. In Rayonier, Inc. v. United States,"T
the Court again refused a restrictive interpretation of the Tort Claims Act,
78
and allowed the claimant to recover for the negligence of the Forest Service
during a forest fire. In response to a government argument that to allow
recovery for a forest fire would subject the Treasury to heavy burdens, the
Court replied that this might be true but, "there is no justification for this
Court to read exemptions into the act beyond those provided for by Con-
gress." 79
It is true that those courts which deny recovery by prisoners under the
Tort Claims Act do not violate the letter of the Supreme Court's liberal
holdings regarding recovery under that Act. This is so because the implied
exclusion is read into the Compensation Act rather than the Tort Claims
Act.8 0 However, it is suggested that the Grande result violates the spirit of
the Rayonier, decision. The Supreme Court has made it clear that they in-
tend to allow tort recovery against the government except when Congress
has clearly excluded a particular claim. Since Congress has not explicitly
excluded prisoners' claims in either the Federal Tort Claims Act or the Pris-
on Industries Fund, the Second Circuit's discovery of an implied exclusion
in the nature of compensation would appear to be at variance with the Su-
preme Court's clear policy of liberal interpretation of the Tort Claims Act.
The Supreme Court has taken certiorari in Demko.8 1 In so doing, it ap-
pears that the question of the inherent exclusiveness of compensation will
be finally settled. The authors take the position that the Supreme Court
should affirm the Third Circuit's decision and allow federal prisoners to re-
cover under both the Prison Industries Fund and the Federal Tort Claims
Act.
In taking this position, it is not denied that Congress could have prohib-
ited such double recovery; but that only by torturing both law and logic can
it be claimed that such denial is prescribed by the present state of the law.
If the Court affirms Demko, Congress might consider amending the Prison
Id. at 69.
-352 U.S. 315 (1957).
78 In fact, the Court was even more decisive in its rejection of a restrictive interpretation
of the Tort Claims Act. Indian Towing was a 5-4 decision while Rayonier was 7-2.
"0 Rayonier v. United States, supra note 77, at 320.
80 This, of course, is the rationale of Grande and the legacy of Feres.
1 Demko v. United states, 383 U.S. 966 (1966).
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Industries Fund so as to make recovery under it exclusive. However, it would
seem that sound public policy would dictate against such exclusivity unless
the amendment also made prison compensation a matter of right rather than
the subject of executive benevolence.
The Court's consideration of Demko may mark the beginning of a sig-
nificant new era in the development of human rights. Now that the "due
process" clause has been effectively used to define the rights of the accused,
it seems only fitting that the Court should be equally concerned with the
rights of the convicted.
It remains only to point out two issues which will arise if Demko is af-
firmed. Will the decision be given retroactive effect? More specifically
could Grande who was denied recovery in the Second Circuit, five months
after the Third Circuit allowed Demko to recover, have his cause recon-
sidered in light of the fact that no petition for certiorari has been granted?
What of the plaintiff who never brought an action because of the supposed
exclusivity of the Compensation Act, but is not barred by the statute of lim-
itations from now proceeding under the Tort Claims Act?
Finally, if recovery is allowed under both the Prison Industries Fund and
the Federal Tort Claims Act should the amount of compensation recovered
be deducted from the tort recovery? At least one case8 2 has suggested that
there should be such a deduction and this result appears logical. While there
is no clear statutory authority for the deduction it would appear that as a
simple matter of measure of damages in tort, double recovery could be
denied.*
s' Winston v. United States, 305 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1962).
* Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not agree with the Third Circuit or the authors.
On December 5, 1966, after the Comment went to press, the Court reversed Demko. 35 U.S.L.
WFEK 4028 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1966) (No. 76).
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